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4 May 1977

out of the discussion

Dear Jim,

Thanks for your letter of 2 April concerning the CIA briefing on the Soviet Navy. I have reviewed the points of contention as noted in your enclosure with a great deal of interest. As is often the case, in discussions like this the use of proper terminology is often at the heart of things.

point
In that connection I will definitely amend our briefing to stick to the accepted terminology of Sea Control and Protection of Power as the combative functions of the Soviet and U.S. navies with the peacetime applications of both of those functions for Naval Presence also to be considered. This will take the discussion out of the terms "defense," "strike," "fire power," "forward posture," and "peripheral." I think we can come close to accommodating your point on the threat against the SLOCs by pointing out that the Soviet sea denial capability has first been concentrated on waters close to their homeland but that over the years it has expanded to a capability against our principal SLOCs. I think our statement on page 13 that we know definitely that the Soviets expect the war to be finished before severance of SLOCs would have any effect is far too strong. We'll tone that down accordingly.

Perhaps the one point in which I thought the point of contention in your enclosure overstated things a bit was on the Soviet capability for projecting power even in areas approximate to the Soviet Union. It seems to me that their amphibious assault capability is quite small and their tactical air projection capability from the sea almost nil. ashore,

I am also persuaded that the DCI's projections of the size of the Soviet surface fleet in 1985 is more accurate than that in the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP), but I am happy to have our people get together and go through those calculations in detail.

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It appears to me that most of the other points are fairly minor and easily resolved. In any event, I will look forward to having our analysts in this area get together with yours once we have revised our presentation, ~~and see if we can at least identify any areas of substantial disagreement and the reasons for the disagreements clearly identified in subsequent presentations that the CIA makes.~~

Many thanks for bringing this to my attention. I look forward to working out the details.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

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Washington, D. C. 20350

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
4 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

1. What could we do to strengthen the Espionage Act to make it feasible to prosecute people for "industrial espionage" as opposed to pure military espionage?

2. I've heard it stated that under the Espionage Act we could convict people for sending information to a potential enemy about the disposition of military forces but that we could not prosecute for sending information about the characteristics of new weapon systems, etc.



Stansfield Turner
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

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